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CORPORATE INVERSION: WILL THE AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT
OF 2004 REDUCE THE INCENTIVE TO RE-INCORPORATE?
By: Eloine Kim*

I.

Introduction

Corporate inversions are transactions by which groups of corporations based in
the United States are restructured to create new foreign parent corporations for the
purpose of obtaining reduced U.S. tax on income from foreign and domestic operations.
Over the last few years there was a wave of U.S.-based multinational corporate groups
restructuring themselves so that the new parent corporation was located in a low-tax or
no-tax jurisdiction. 2 These corporations decided to move offshore for the purpose of
remaining competitive in the global marketplace) Such corporations have
4 included Tyco
International. Ingersoll-Rand, Cooper Industries, and Fruit of the Loom.
Part II provides an overview of the corporate inversion phenomenon. Part III
explains reasons for corporate inversion. Part IV discusses the effects of corporate
inversion on the U.S. economy. Part V details the methods that corporations use to
undertake inversion transactions. including stock transactions, asset transactions and drop
down transactions along with earnings stripping techniques. Part VI examines previous
tax treatment of stock and asset transactions and current tax treatment of earnings
stripping. Part VII discusses the anti-inversion provisions of the newly enacted American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004. Part VIII explains that further measures are necessary in order
to balance the need to retain the U.S. tax base while allowing U.S.-based multinational
corporations to remain competitive in an increasingly global economy.
II.

An Overview of the Corporate Inversion Phenomenon

Corporate inversion is no longer such a hot topic for the press as it once was.
but it nonetheless continues to be a problem for the U.S. 5 A corporate inversion
transaction occurs where a company moves its headquarters offshore, thus allowing it to
avoid paying a substantial amount of taxes which result from being headquartered in the

Eloine Kim is astudent at Hofstra University School of Law who holds an undergraduate degree
from Comell University. An enormous amount of gratitude is owed to Professor Richard Beck and
Professor Marshall Tracht for their invaluable guidance. and incredible expertise.
1Corporate Inversion Transactions: Tax Policy Implications. Office of Tax Policy, Department of
the Treasury (May 2002) available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/inversion.pdf (last
accessed Oct. 5, 2004).
2 Why Inversions Have Turned Some US Politicians' Thinking Upside Down. at
hnp://www.offshoreon.com/articles/3242.asp?docid=3242 (last accessed Oct. 21, 2004).
3 See supra note 1. at 27.
4 See supra note 2.
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United States. 6 In certain cases, all that is involved is not much more than a domestic
corporation opening a post office box in a low-tax or no-tax jurisdiction such as Bermuda
or the Cayman Islands. 7 The company's employees and operations usually remain in the
United States. s The types of corporations that engage in corporate inversion transactions
are ones that have substantial foreign profits. 9 Corporations that only sell in U.S. markets
are unable to lower tax liability through inversion transactions, so these transactions are
limited to corporations that compete in international markets.")
Many corporations undergo corporate inversion transactions claiming that the
new structure allows for increased operational flexibility, better cash management, and
access to international capital markets." However, according to the U.S. Treasury
Department. these reasons are pretext. 2 The U.S. Treasury Department claims that
inversions allow corporate groups to save a considerable amount
on taxes, but that this
3
savings comes at the expense of the United States as a whole.'
By undergoing a corporate inversion transaction which may not be much more
than a paper transaction, a multinational corporate group may significantly reduce its
worldwide income that is subject to taxation.' 4 When the parent corporation is moved out
of the U.S. and into
a low-tax or no-tax jurisdiction, U.S. tax rules cease to apply to the
15
group as a whole.
Corporate inversion became popular because many U.S.-based multinational
corporations in the United States realized that their bottom lines could be significantly
improved through considerable tax savings which would be achieved by relocating their
16
foreign subsidiaries so that they were not subject to the taxing jurisdiction of the U.S.
Many U.S.-based multinational corporations have decided to diminish the adverse effects
that the U.S. tax code has on their profitability and competitiveness by reincorporating in
places such as Bermuda, Barbados, the Cayman Islands and other jurisdictions with low
or no corporate income tax. 17 This reincorporation is legal under U.S. law since there is
no requirement that a company sell or produce anything in its country of residence.18
Bermuda is one of the most preferred locations for corporate inversion because of its
geographic proximity to the U.S., its stable political system and its legal system which is

6 Joint Committee on Taxation. Background and Description of Present-Law Rules and Proposals
Relating to Corporate Inversion Transactions. June 6, 2002, available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x52-02.pdf (last accessed Nov. 10. 2004).
7 Joseph Summerhill. An Update on Department of Homeland Security Contracting. Contract
Management September 1.2004.
SId.
'2004 WTD 214-10

"Id.
CorporatehIversions: Beckett G. Cantley. Will the Repo Act Keep Corporations From Moving to
Bermuda, 3 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1 (2003).

12See satpra note I at 7.
13See stpranote I at 9.
'' See sapranote II. at 4.
5 The Berntnda hltersion. WALL ST. J. May 21. 2002. at A18.
L6Jonathan Weisman. PatriotismRaining on Tax Paradise:Lawumakers are Cha ing at Firsthat
Exist Offshore Only on Paper,WASH POST. Aug. 21. 2002. at El.
17id.
18 Id.
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21)

similar to that of the U.S.' 9 There is no income tax or capital gains tax in Bermuda.
Also, business in Bermuda is not highly regulated and corporate executive liability is
reduced.21
Corporate inversion activity is a result of fundamental problems with the U.S.
tax rules that govern international transactions. 22 U.S.-based multinational corporations
have grown increasingly frustrated with the tax rules that place them at an economic
disadvantage and have consequently looked to the corporate inversion transaction to
alleviate their tax burdens. 23 These corporations have found themselves faced with the
pressure of considering corporate inversion in order to receive more favorable tax
treatment that
results from reincorporating offshore and thus being treated as a foreign
24
corporation.
The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 that was recently signed into law by
President Bush contains important anti-inversion provisions that will succeed in deterring
corporate inversion even though it contains no provisions providing for a solution for the
problem of earnings stripping. 25 However, the fact remains that the U.S. is still not an
ideal place for a multinational corporation to be headquartered. 26 The U.S. tax system
gives better results to foreign corporations and thus needs further revision in order to
address the underlying problems that corporate inversion
27 is symptomatic of and to make
the U.S. a preferred location for American corporations.
III. Reasons for Corporate Inversion
The U.S. international tax system heavily burdens U.S.-based multinational
corporations. 28 The rules promulgated by the Internal Revenue Code adversely affect the
international competitiveness of U.S-based corporations in the global economy. 29 What
motivates corporations to undertake inversions is the prospect of reducing tax liability.
The National Foreign Trade Council conducted a study examining U.S. international tax

, David Cay Johnston, U.S. CorporationsAre Using Bennuda To Slash Tax Bills, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 18, 2002, at Al.
20Id.A capital gain is the profit that is made from the sale of an investment or an asset. See
http://www.taxesindepth.com/capital-gains-tax-laws.html (last accessed March 5. 2005).
21Veronique de Rugby, Runawa.y Corporations:PoliticalBand Aids vs. Long Term Solutions, 9 Tax
& Budget Bull. I (July 2002).
22Heather Campbell. When Good Tax Law Goes Bad: Stanley Works' Recent Dilentnia and How the
Internal Revenue Code Disadvantages U.S. MultinationalCorporationsForcingtheir Flight to
Foreign Jurisdictions.31 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 95, at I 1.
23 Id.

24See supra note 1. at 27.
2' See 108 P.L. 357. See 2004 WTD 208-21.
26See Mihir Desai & James R. Hines, Jr.. Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing the Causes and
Consequences of CorporateIlversions, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 409, 421 (2002).

27See supra note I. at 29. The U.S. Treasury Department had proposed a multifaceted solution to
combating the problem of corporate inversion. The Treasury Department recommended a
comprehensive reexamination of the U.S. international tax rules and the economic assumptions
underlying them.

20See supra note 27, at 415.
2' See Terrence R. Chorvat. Ending the Taxation of Foreign Business Income, 42 ARIZ L. REV. 835
(2000).
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policy. 3" The study found that the United States is a relatively undesirable location for a
multinational corporation's legal domicile and concluded that "a significant
modernization of the U.S. rules is necessary to restore competitive balance in the vastly3
changed circumstances of the global economy of the 21st century." '
In the 2000 issue of the Economist. William Woods, chief executive of the
Bermuda Stock Exchange stated, "Bill Gates would be fabulously wealthier if he had
started Microsoft in Bermuda. He may have known a lot about computer programming
when he started the company, but his ignorance about tax cost him a fortune. Mr. Gates
has not done badly even so, but he knows better now. The new company that he recently
co-founded is now incorporated in Bermuda. 32
One of the main reasons that U.S.-based multinational corporations have
chosen to invert is that (unlike other countries) the U.S taxes the worldwide income of
corporations incorporated in the U.S. as residents, no matter where the corporation is
actually managed. 33 Thus, unlike many other countries which assign corporate residence
according to place of management, where a corporation is incorporated has enormous tax
consequences under the Internal Revenue Code. 34 The U.S. is virtually alone in the world
in classifying corporate residence solely by place of incorporation. This has proved to be
a highly artificial and unrealistic rule that gives an unjustifiable advantage to U.S. run
corporations that are incorporated offshore as well as new corporations that decide to
incorporate elsewhere from the start. The worldwide taxation system employed by the
U.S. results in corporations being taxed on their worldwide income irrespective of the
location of the source of the income. 35 The fiscal arm of the U.S. Treasury reaches around
the globe and claims a right to a portion of any income earned by a U.S. corporation
anywhere in the world. 36
Income earned by a U.S. corporation from international transactions is subject
to taxation in at least two jurisdictions: the residence country and the source country.37
U.S.-based multinational corporations pay corporate income taxes on all income
generated in the U.S. (U.S. source income) and income earned abroad (foreign source
income). Under the worldwide system, U.S. corporations cannot bring income of their
subsidiaries back into the U.S. without having to pay taxes on it. U.S.-based multinational
corporations end up being double taxed on their foreign earnings because taxes must be
paid in the foreign country where profits were earned and in most situations, the U.S. also
taxes the same profits regardless of whether they are repatriated to the U.S. If the foreign
subsidiary of a U.S. corporation does not have to pay tax on foreign operations for some
reason, when it repatriates income to the U.S. as dividends, it is usually taxed on that
repatriated income. 38 In addition, a U.S. corporation can also be taxed on certain income
30See National Foreign Trade Council Territorial Tax Study Report (2002). available at

http://nftc.infovine.conVupload/Territorial%20Repon.pdf (last accessed September 14. 2004).
31 Id.

32See http://www.taxprophet.com/hot-topic/August03.shtml (last accessed October II, 2004).
33Corporate Inversion Transactions. supra. at 1.
34id.
35See stpra note 29. at 838.
36Id.

Under the worldwide tax system. a U.S.-based multinational corporation is issued credit for
taxes that it pays to the foreign parent country, on its foreign source income, and where the
subsidiary is located and the income is derived.
37See su ra note 27, at 414.
38id.
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39
earned by its foreign subsidiary. whether or not the income is repatriated to the U.S.
The corporate tax ends up being a double or triple tax on the same income because the
and the dividends and capital gains resulting from corporate
original investment is taxed
4
income are taxed again. 0
In contrast to the worldwide system, under a territorial tax regime, tax is
4
imposed only on income derived in that country. This is known as territorial taxation. '
Many foreign competitors of U.S.-based multinational corporations are usually subject to
territorial tax regimes. 42 Because of this disparity, U.S. corporations are extremely
disadvantaged in terms of tax burdens. 4 3 Corporate inversion has thus become a way for
U.S-based multinational corporations to escape the heavy burden of the U.S. worldwide
tax regime and instead be subject to a less onerous territorial regime." For tax purposes,
most multinational corporations would prefer to be considered residents of jurisdictions
that follow the territorial system rather than the worldwide system.4 5 Under a territorial
system, corporations generally have lower tax costs associated with operations; if
business profits are earned in a low-tax country, the income is subjected only to the low
tax rate.4 '
A foreign corporation which has a subsidiary in the U.S. must pay taxes to its
home government only on the profits that it earned within its home country. Profits
earned from operations within the U.S. would already have been taxed by the U.S. The
foreign corporation would then be permitted to repatriate its after-tax profits from the
U.S. back to its home country without owing any additional taxes to its home
government. 47This differing treatment serves as a significant advantage for foreign
corporations.
The 35 percent corporate tax rate in the U.S. is the fourth highest among the 26
developed countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). 4' A U.S.-based corporation pays the 35 percent rate plus an average state rate of
49
5 percent. totaling 40 percent on its income generated worldwide. Making matters

3 Id.
40 Id.

41Id. Under a territorial regime. any income that is earned in a foreign country. beyond the borders

of the U.S. is not taxed.
42 See generally Elizabeth Chorvat. You Can't Take It With You: Behavioral Finance and Corporate
Expatriation. 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 453.
43

id.

4' See Derek E. Anderson, Turning the Corporate Inversion Transaction Right Side Up: Proposed
Legislation in the 108"' Congress Aints to Stamp Out Any Economic Vitality ofthe Corporate

Inversion Transaction, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 267.
45 Id. Most foreign jurisdictions have corporate tax systems that tax income only in the jurisdiction
where the income isearned. Consequently. a foreign parent corporation that has its main office in the
foreign parent's jurisdiction but has a subsidiary in a different foreign jurisdiction will not be taxed
by the foreign parent jurisdiction on the income earned by its foreign subsidiary.
4"See Carol P.Tello. Inversion Transactions: New Style Transactions Raise New Policy Issues. 43
Tax Management Memorandum (2002).
47id.

41See Legislative Update: Proposed Changes to Tax Treatment of Inversion Transactions in Pending
FSC/ETI Repeal Legislation. available at

http://www.us.kpmg.com/microsite/taxnewsflash/2004/Ju/04196.html (last accessed October 22.
2004).
49 Id.
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worse, according to the accounting firm KPMG, there is a global trend toward declining
corporate tax rates. 5" The 40 percent combined federal-state corporate tax rate of the U.S.
is higher than that of any other OECD country and is also much higher than the 30
percent average in those developed nations. 5 1 Because of the worldwide system that the
U.S. employs, even if another country had the same corporate tax rates as the U.S.,
corporations in the U.S. would still end up paying more in taxes.5 - This high corporate
tax rate in conjunction with the worldwide tax system places many U.S.-based
multinational corporations at a significant disadvantage. 53 Corporations with substantial
markets in nations with low corporate tax rates may become susceptible to foreign
takeover since foreign corporations that have an advantage over U.S.-based corporations
may grow more quickly and gain market share from U.S. competitors.
The problem of double taxation posed by the worldwide system is dealt with by
a system of foreign tax credits. which is purported to reduce the tax burden on U.S.-based
multinational corporations. 55 Under the foreign tax credit system, credit is issued to a
multinational corporation for tax that is paid to a foreign country: It follows that since
the U.S. corporate tax rate is 35 percent, credit is available up to that amount. 57 A
corporation ends up paying the same amount as it would have if the income had been
generated within the residence country, but it pays tax to both the foreign country and the
country of residence. 58 The effectiveness of the credits under the foreign tax credit
scheme has been limited because the scheme required income to be categorized into
baskets whereby the foreign tax credit rules were separately applied to reduce the income
that the foreign tax credits could be applied against.5 9 This situation is also made more
complex by Subpart F which may require income from active foreign business operations
to be currently taxed although income earned through foreign subsidiary corporations of
U.S. parent corporations is generally not taxable until distribution by the foreign
subsidiary to the U.S. parent.
If a U.S.-based multinational corporation paid tax to a foreign country for the
income it derived from that foreign country. the U.S. would then reduce the amount of
tax that the corporation would pay to the U.S. by the amount of tax it paid to the foreign
country. 6 Despite the fact that the foreign tax credit system was designed to protect
against the prospect of double taxation, U.S.-based multinational corporations are still
disadvantaged because of having to pay tax on income derived from both domestic
50

Id.

51 Id.
5' See sufpra note 2.
53 id.
54 id.

55See supra note 42. at 456.
5

6 id.

57id.

58See Reuven Avi-Yonah. For Haven's Sake: Reflections on Inversion Transactions. 95 Tax Notes

1793 (2002)
51Id. Further discussion will ensue in subsequent sections since the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004 modifies this.

6 See supra note 22. In order to mitigate possible double taxation of U.S. taxpayers on foreign
source income, limited credit is allowed against the U.S. corporate tax for certain income taxes paid
to foreign countries. The credit is only available up to the amount of tax that may be attributed to
foreign income. Ifthe foreign tax amounts to less than the U.S. tax, the U.S. collects an), incremental
income tax on the foreign income where the U.S. tax rate exceeds that of the foreign country.
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operations and foreign sources. Foreign corporations are taxed at a 35 percent rate only
on the amount of U.S. source income." The following is a simplified numerical example
illustrating this fact:
Ireland has a 12.5 percent corporate tax rate. An U.S.-based multinational
corporation would pay 40 percent in taxes on its income earned in Ireland. If the
corporation earned $1.000.000 in Ireland. the breakdown of taxes is as follows: The
corporation would have to pay 12.5 percent of $1,000,000 ($125,000) to the Irish
government. The U.S. government would then credit the corporation for the amount that
was paid to Ireland and then proceed to collect the difference between the taxable amount
under the U.S. tax rate and the credited amount (35% * $1,000,000 - 125,000 =
$225,000). In addition, 5 percent of $1,000,000 ($50,000) would most likely be collected
by the U.S. corporation's state of incorporation, bringing the grand total of taxes on
income earned in Ireland to $400,000. If the income is earned by a subsidiary
incorporated in Ireland, as is usually the case, the subsidiary's earnings will not be taxed
in the U.S. until repatriated to the U.S. parent.
In contrast, a country such as Germany that is subject to a territorial system that
does business in Ireland would only have to pay 12.5 percent of $1,000,000 ($125,000
total) on its income earned in Ireland.6 - This simplistic example indicates the disparity in
tax treatment63that motivates U.S.-based multinational corporations to undertake inversion
transactions.
Undertaking an inversion transaction can be costly because of legal, accounting
and banking fees."4 Also, shareholders of the original U.S. corporation must, in effect,
sell their shares and realize capital gains, which may trigger tax liabilities. They then
receive new shares in the foreign corporation exactly equal to their old shares: although
ownership doesn't change. the inversion process generates tax liabilities for many
shareholders.6 - Despite the cost, corporations decide to undertake inversions anyway
because the tax savings over the long run are considerable. 6 Economists Mihir Desai and
James Hines
found a significant increase in stock prices for companies announcing
inversions. 67 Investors realize that their after-tax earnings will be higher and bid up stock
prices, thereby compensating shareholders for the taxes they may incur in the process. 6
Inversion transactions allow corporations to escape the heavy burden that the
U.S. tax system places on the activities of their foreign subsidiaries. 69 Through inversion
transactions, corporate groups may be able to remove some or all of their foreign income
from the U.S. taxing jurisdiction, thus potentially allowing them to achieve pure

61
62

id.
id.

63 Id. Another

simplistic example presented: if a corporation owed a total of $10 of income tax to its
residence country (Country A)on the income earned in Country B.but it had already paid $2in tax
on that same income toCountry B. then the corporation would only owe Country A $8 in taxes
because of the credit received. This credit is limited and usually cannot exceed the tax that would be
paid on the foreign-source income in the residence country.
6'See stpra note 15. See also Paul Tharp. Corporations Heading Soulth-Looking for the Great Tax

Dodge, N.Y. POST. Feb. 12. 2002, at 32.
65 Id.

6
67

id.
See supra note 27.

6 id.

" See Bruce Bartlett. Why the Itversion Aversion. National Review. Aug. 12. 2002.
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territorial tax treatment. This is the reason that corporate inversions are often referred to
as self-help territoriality. t
Another benefit that corporations are able to derive from undertaking inversion
7
transactions is the significant reduction of tax liability by means of earnings stripping. 1
Tax deductions for interest paid on business debt are permitted by IRC section 163. This
has been a 72primary motivator for corporations to engage in corporate inversion
transactions.
Corporations are motivated to undergo inversion transactions in order to reap
the economic benefits that stem from having to pay less tax on foreign source income.
Restructuring a U.S.-based multinational corporation through a mere paper transaction
that results in the removal of income from foreign operations from the U.S. tax base can
73
save a corporation an enormous amount. It has been said that under U.S. tax law, a
corporation can be considered foreign even if its presence in the foreign country consists
74
of nothing but "a file drawer and a lawyer.", A U.S.-based multinational corporation
may avoid having to pay a large amount of taxes by setting up a mail drop in a foreign
country. 79 The mail drop can effectively turn the U.S.-based corporation into one of that
foreign country. 76 When a U.S.-based parent corporation is moved out of the jurisdiction
of U.S. taxation, most U.S. tax rules cease to apply to the corporate group as a whole. A
mere paper transaction can greatly reduce the worldwide income of the corporation that is
77
subject to taxation.
IV. The Effects of Corporate Inversion
The phenomenon of corporate inversion has negative implications for the U.S.
economy. Corporate inversions erode the U.S. tax base and have adverse effects on other
7s
businesses that have not engaged in inversion activities as well as individual taxpayers.
It has been estimated that inversion transactions have eroded the tax base by
79
According to Congress' Joint Committee on
approximately $70 billion dollars.
Taxation, corporate expatriates are expected to dodge $4.8 billion in federal taxes over
the next 10 years.5 1 The more corporations that undergo inversion transactions, the fewer
70id.
71See Rules Against Earnings Stripping: Wrong Answer to Corporate Inversions. Gary Clyde
Hufbauer and Ariel Assa. available at http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pbO3-7.pdf (last accessed
September 22. 2004).
Earnings stripping to be discussed in detail in section Ill.
72See supra note 58. Explanation of how taxable income can be reduced through deductible
payments of interest.
73See Glen Johnson. Congress Looks to Plug Tax Loophole: Bill Targets Advantages Sought by U.S.
Firn that hIcorporate Offshore. Boston Globe. Mar. 12. 2002. at D1.
74 Id.

75Id. Bermuda and Barbados are preferred locations for corporate inversion because they offer
favorable conditions for corporate tax regimes and existing U.S. income tax treaties.
76
id.

77See Bermuda Bound Companies Dodge Their Duty. Michael Miller. available at
http://seattle.bizjoumals.com/seattle/stories/2002/O5/27/editoria13.html (last accessed September 15.
2004).
71See suqpra note 42. at 457.
7"See stiqranote 73.

80See stqira note 6.
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corporations there are paying U.S. taxes. 8 1 This results in the remaining U.S. taxpayers
being responsible for a larger portion of taxes. Corporate inversions make the public
question and feel resentful towards the U.S. tax system.8 2 Taxpayers may become
disgruntled and lose confidence in the system. 83 One Congressman aptly stated,
"Corporate inversions make average 84taxpayers feel like chumps; we have to pay more
because the big guys are paying less.,
Corporate inversions have the negative effect of pressuring other U.S.-based
multinational corporations to invert in order to remain competitive in the global
marketplace. 85 Corporations that do not join the bandwagon and invert may find
themselves at a significant economic disadvantage. Sometimes this pressure is too much
for other corporations to resist so they follow suit and choose to undergo international
restructuring like some of their counterparts. 86 The amount of taxes which must be paid
often dictates the prices corporations set and in turn the profits that can be made. A U.S.based corporation that inverts and reduces its tax burden will most likely have increased
profitability. The increased profitability may be87passed to consumers and shareholders by
means of lower prices and increased dividends.
Another negative effect of corporate inversion that has been cited is that it
limits shareholder rights. 88 The legal rights of shareholders are limited in that in some
foreign countries, corporate officers and directors cannot be sued. Some foreign
jurisdictions refuse to enforce U.S. judgments against officers and directors of
corporations. But the prospect of this has not really materialized as a true negative effect
because corporate shareholders seem to have been willing to surrender some legal rights
be had by the corporation's increased profitability through
for favor of
9 the benefits to
inversion.8
V.

Methods of Inversion and Earnings Stripping

There are several methods for achieving corporate inversion through foreign
reincorporation. The three primary methods that corporations have used to reincorporate
are: stock transactions, asset transactions and drop down transactions. 9" Each of these
methods will now be discussed in turn but will also be addressed again in the subsequent

81See Stanley Works and Corporate Inversion, available at

http://www.thunderbird.edu/pdf/about-us/caseseries/aO603OOO5.pdf (last accessed Nov. 3. 2004).

82 id.
83

4

id.

Voting with Their Feet. Richard W. Rahn. National Review Feb. 23. 2004.

85See supra note 44. at 270.

Id.
Tax News and Developments. available at
http://www.bakerinfo.com/NR/rdonlyres/ewepnocyrpqf6tfvtzvzb43vg52bqnwncedcnzqu6o4tvvhwq
cmco3xh6wdirdp4ixdu5qjx7vyjdi/ALERT+Mar+ t5+02+-+lnversions.pdf (last accessed September
15.2004).
88See supra. note I I at 3. See also Treasury to Require Information on Corporate Inversion. The
United States Mission to the European Union. available at
http://www.useu.be/Categories/CorporateGovemance/Novl 302TreasuryCorporatetnversion.htm
(last accessed October 1. 2004).
86

87 See

8 Id.
9 See sLupra, note 58.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

9

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 8
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

sections of this note since the recently enacted American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 has
new implications for such transactions. 9'
In stock transactions, the stock of the U.S. corporation is exchanged for the
stock of the newly formed foreign corporation.92 All this does is convert ownership the
foreign corporation ends up being the owner and the U.S. corporation either becomes a
subsidiary or transfers all its property to the foreign corporation. The shareholders of the
U.S. corporation receive at least eighty percent of the stock of the newly formed foreign
corporation after this transaction. Neither the foreign corporation nor its subsidiaries
conduct substantial business activities within the new country of incorporation. The
newly formed foreign parent acquires shares of the U.S. corporation.
The U.S. parent
93
corporation survives as a subsidiary of the new foreign parent.
Asset transactions occur where a U.S. corporation directly reincorporates in a
foreign country. 94A new foreign corporation is formed and the U.S. corporation merges
into the new corporation, just as two unrelated corporations could merge. The result of
this transaction is that the shareholders end up holding the stock of the foreign
corporation since the U.S. corporation has become a subsidiary of the foreign
corporation. 95 Stockholders then exchange their shares in the U.S. corporation for shares
in the foreign corporation.
Drop down transactions are hybrid transactions that have characteristics of both
stock and asset transactions. 96 In a drop down transaction, the U.S. corporation transfers
its assets to a newly formed foreign parent corporation. Some of those assets are then
transferred back to the original U.S. corporation to form the basis of the U.S. subsidiary
of the new foreign corporation. The result of this is that the original U.S. corporation does
not exist anymore and the U.S. stock gets merged with the stock of the new foreign
corporation. Shareholders end up holding the same amount in the new foreign
97
corporation as they did in the now extinct U.S. corporation.
Depending upon the corporation's individual tax consequences with regards to
its shareholders, each method varies, but all have resulted in the corporate structure being
inverted. Each method generally has had no effect on a corporation's operations but
managed to allow the corporation to avoid excess taxation.9'
In addition to reincorporating in foreign jurisdictions, corporations may derive
further advantages from inverted structures by engaging in earnings stripping techniques
108 P.L. 357 referred to as American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.
92See supra note 58.
'13
Id. An inversion may be accompanied or followed by further restructuring of the corporate group.
With stock inversions, a U.S. corporation might transfer some or all of its foreign subsidiaries
directly to the new foreign parent corporation or other related foreign corporations in order to
remove income from foreign operations from the tax reach of the U.S. Consequently. the subpart F
anti-deferral rules that may apply to controlled foreign corporations no longer apply to those foreign
subsidiaries and the U.S. would not impose tax upon any dividends paid by such foreign subsidiaries
in the future to the new foreign parent. This allows for the achievement of treatment similar to that
which could be obtained under a purely territorial system. Other similar benefits may also be had in
connection with foreign operations that may be set up in the future by starting such operations under
the new foreign parent corporation instead of under the U.S. corporation.
94
1d.
9Id.

% See stpra note 48. at 27 1.
97 id.
98 Id.
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in order to reduce taxable income. 9) The ability to partake in earnings stripping is one of
the main benefits of corporate inversion."' A feature that is common to many inversion
transactions is that the reincorporation results in the former U.S. parent being
substantially indebted to the new foreign parent or one of its foreign subsidiaries.""
Earnings stripping occurs where a significant portion of a corporation's U.S. generated
income is redirected to the foreign corporation so that it becomes non-taxable.')2
3
Techniques include having a capital structure that is high in debt and low in equity.' A
U.S. corporation can make payments on a loan created by a foreign parent. Loans are not
included in gross income and as such the transfer of income disguised as a loan is not
taxed. 1" Under IRC section 163, the interest portion is fully deductible as a business
interest expense. After interest is paid, there may hardly be any earnings left to be taxed
by the U.S."" Payments of royalties, rents or management service fees to the new foreign
parent or other foreign affiliates are also deductible and can thus be a mode of partaking
in earnings stripping. Payments by a U.S. corporation to a foreign corporation are usually
subject to a withholding tax, but such taxes may be reduced by an income tax treaty, if
one exists between the U.S. and that particular foreign country.11 6 It should be noted that
apart from earnings stripping, inversion does not help the U.S. parent company's tax
position on its U.S. income or its directly earned foreign income either. Instead, it takes
the U.S. parent's foreign subsidiaries out of carry forward credit status because the
foreign subsidiaries will now be owned by a foreign parent. Thus all sorts of tax haven
income from carry forward credits will no longer be taxed currently in the U .S. If a
dividend is actually paid home to a U.S. owner, though, the income will be taxed in the
U.S.
VI. Previous Tax Treatment of Stock and Asset Transactions and Credit Tax
Treatment of Earnings Stripping
For the different types of inversion transactions, there were immediate tax

consequences to the U.S. corporations or to the U.S. shareholders who were exchanging
stock.'1 7 For stock transactions, U.S. shareholders who were exchanging stock generally
had to recognize gains. but not losses under section 367(a)."1 s Gains were equal to the
' See supra. note 71. See also Treasury Willing to Look at Refinements to Earnings Stripping Safe

Harbor Proposal. Allison Bennett. Daily Tax Rep., March 5. 2003.
oSee 36 Tax Notes Int'l 387.
"' See id.
102
See Gary Clyde Hufbauer. Institute for International Economics. Testimony before the Committee
on Ways and Means. United States House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.. June 6. 2002.
available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/hutbauer06O2.htm (last accessed October 28.
2004).
"o' See

id.

I See id.
05 See stpra note 58. A U.S. parent cannot engage in the same techniques because it files a
consolidated return with its U.S. subsidiaries: therefore, interest payments within the same corporate
group net out. However. when a U.S. corporation undertakes an inversion transaction, the new
foreign parent corporation may then strip earnings out of U.S. subsidiaries. See also I.R.C. Section
163(j).
"' See supra note 102.

107
See 36 Tax Notes Int'l 341.
" See id. See also I.R.C. Section 367(a).
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difference between the fair market value of the shares received of the foreign corporation
9
and the adjusted basis of the shares of the U.S. corporation that were exchanged. 1
For asset inversions, the U.S. corporation had to recognize gain, but not loss
under section 367(a) as if it had sold all of its assets.'"" However, in asset inversions, U.S.
shareholders recognized neither gain nor loss provided that the transaction qualified as a
nontaxable reorganization under section 368.111 Tax attributes such as net operating
losses or foreign tax credits could generally reduce or eliminate the U.S. federal income
tax on any gain recognized in an inversion.' 12
The IRS enacted IRC section 163(j) in 1989 in order to prevent corporations
from claiming excessive interest deductions.' '- Section 163(j) comes into play when the
debt to equity ratio of a U.S. corporation exceeds 1.5 to I, whereupon all interest amounts
that are in excess of 50 percent of the corporation's gross income are nondeductible.
When a party that is paying interest is moderately to highly leveraged, section 163(j)
disallows deductions for interest paid to other related parties such as parents and
subsidiaries for loans.'' 4 Section 163(j) serves to prevent U.S. corporations from
excessively leveraging a corporation in order to reduce its taxable income. But like the
other existing IRC sections, 163(j) has not been sufficient to deter U.S. corporations from
undertaking inversions. Proposals have been made to deter earnings stripping by applying
a stricter debt to equity ratio for
corporations that have inverted, but none of the proposals
5
have materialized as of yet.' 1
VII. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004
On October 22. 2004. President Bush signed the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004 into law. The act amends nearly 600 code sections and makes the most large scale
revisions since the 1986 Tax Reform Act."' The new law repeals the U.S. tax code's
extraterritorial income exclusion (ETI) which had been ruled illegal by the World Trade

"n See id.
See id.
. See id. See also I.R.C. Section 368.
112See 2004 WTD 208-21.
It3

See Testimony of Pamela Olson, Acting Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), United States

Department of the Treasury Before the House Committee On Ways and Means On Corporate
Inversion Transactions. available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po356.htm (last
accessed Oct. 2. 2004). See also I.R.C. Section 163().
"' See id.
'1 See stpra note 122. at 115. Explaining that I.R.C. provisions that were intended to reduce
corporate inversions have had limited effects against U.S. corporations that wanted to undertake
corporate inversion transactions and should therefore be modified or replaced. Neither 163(j)
individually nor collectively with other I.R.C. have had any impact in preventing large corporations
from undergoing inversion transactions anyway. Revising 163(j) may prove to be detrimental to
foreign corporations that have neither participated in nor benefited from any corporate inversion
transactions. Tightening earnings stripping rules could have negative effects on corporations such as
U.S. affiliates of foreign banking institutions. Because interest expense is usually the largest tax
deduction to financial institutions, any deviation in the amount that the I.R.C. decides to treat as
deductible can cause extreme problems. Therefore. any changes in earnings stripping rules must be
considered very carefully and based on the utmost sound tax policy.
6

. See 2004 TNT 202-33
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Organization. 1 7 The ETI is replaced
8 with a nine percent domestic deduction for a range
of domestic production activities.
The new law has important anti-inversion provisions that set forth U.S. federal
tax consequences for domestic corporations that engage in either of two kinds of
specifically defined inversion transactions.' 9 The first type of inversion that the act
defines is a transaction in which (1)a foreign incorporated entity acquires (either directly
or indirectly) substantially all of the properties of a U.S. corporation after March 4, 2003;
(2) the former shareholders of the U.S. corporation hold 80 percent or more (by vote or
value) of the stock of the foreign incorporated entity after the transaction; and (3) the
expanded affiliated group of the foreign corporation does not have substantial business
activities in the foreign corporation's country of incorporation when compared to the total
business activities of the group.' 211 For this particular type of corporate inversion
transaction, the provision considers the foreign corporation to be a domestic corporation
for purposes of the U.S. tax code and the inversion is not acknowledged. The new law
would reclassify the corporation as domestic under section 7701.2'
The second type of inversion that the Act defines is a transaction that would
meet the exact definition of aforementioned type of inversion transaction except that the
80 percent ownership threshold would not be met.' 22 This type of transaction is referred
to as a limited inversion and is subject to milder sanctions than the first type of inversion.
In such a case of a limited inversion, the Act states that if at least a 60 percent ownership
threshold is met, the inversion will be respected and the corporation will be treated as
foreign for tax purposes. 12 However, the corporation will be subject to taxation on any
inversion gain, inversion gain being defined as any gain or income recognized in the
inversion plus any gain or income recognized during the 10 year period following the
inversion by the transfer of stock or other properties, or the license of any property other
24
than section 1221(a)(1) property, by the expatriated entity to a foreign related party.'
such as net operating losses
The corporation will also be barred from using tax attributes
2
and foreign tax credits to offset any such inversion gain.' 5
The new Act includes provisions that aim to reduce the problem of double
taxation on U.S.-based multinational corporations. including the reduction of foreign tax
u See id.
'

See id.

See 105 Tax Notes 711.

",

121See id explaining that: for purposes of the anti-inversion provisions, the term "expanded affiliated
group." means an affiliated group as defined in Section 1504(a) but without regard to Section
1504(b)(3) and by substituting "more than 50%" for "at least 80%." In determining whether each
type of inversion transaction satisfies the stock ownership requirement. stock held by members of
the expanded affiliated group (for example. "hook" stock held by the inverted U.S. corporation) that
includes the foreign corporation. and stock of the foreign corporation issued in a public offering
related tothe inversion transaction. is disregarded. In addition, if a foreign corporation acquires
directly or indirectly substantially all of the properties of a U.S. corporation or partnership during the
four-year period beginning two years before the date on which the ownership requirement for an
inversion transaction is satisfied, the acquisition is treated as pursuant to a plan and constitutes an
inversion.
See id.
122See supra note 116.
121
See id.
124See id. See also I.R.C. Section 1221 (a)( 1)
'25See id.
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credit baskets from nine to two and allowing foreign tax credits to be carried forward for
10 years instead of only five.' 26 The anti-inversion provisions of this act trump any
current and future U.S treaty obligations. No treaty exemptions from the anti-inversion
are available. The provisions apply generally to transactions that took place after March
4. 2004, but they do not apply to transactions that were substantially completed on or
before March 4, 2003.127
The repercussions that the new Act has on the 80 percent inversions are likely
to discourage these types of transactions. 28 Since the act does not acknowledge 80
percent inversions and deems such newly formed foreign corporations to be U.S.
corporations for tax purposes. most corporations will probably avoid undertaking these
transactions since the intended benefits would be denied. 29 Corporations that attempt
these transactions would be acting imprudently, for they would be subject to U.S. federal
income tax on worldwide income regardless of the transaction. The retroactive effective
date of the new Act may also have federal tax consequences for the post-inversion
transactions of corporations that completed an 80 percent inversion after March 4,
2003. '30
The new law significantly increases the cost for undertaking a 60 percent
inversion as well since it denies to the acquired U.S. corporation and related U.S. persons
the right to shelter any inversion gains through the use of tax attributes such as net
operating losses and foreign tax credits.' 3' For stock inversions, the new act also imposes
a 15 percent excise tax (to be increased to 20 percent for 2009 and subsequent years) on
disqualified individuals that hold stock options and other stock-based compensation in
the inverted companies. The inverted U.S. corporation is denied deductions for stock
compensation paid. 32 In the grand scheme, these provisions of the new Act will most
likely deter corporations from undertaking inversion transactions.
Although the Bush administration targeted earnings stripping as a prime
motivation for corporate inversion, the Act does not address earnings stripping but
instead directs the Treasury Department to conduct studies and submit reports on this
problem.' 33 Section 424 of the Act requires the Secretary of the Treasury to conduct a
study of the effectiveness of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 that are
applicable to earnings stripping.' 3 4 The study must include an evaluation of the
effectiveness of section 163 0 ) in preventing the shifting of income outside the U.S.,
whether any deficiencies of earnings stripping provisions place U.S.-based businesses at
a competitive disadvantage in comparison to foreign-based businesses, the impact of
earnings stripping activities on the U.S. tax base, whether laws of foreign countries
facilitate stripping of earnings out of the U.S., and whether changes to the earnings
stripping rules would affect jobs in the U.S.' 35 By June 30, 2005. the Secretary is required
to submit to Congress a report of this study including specific recommendations on how
26

1 See 2004 TNT 213-214.
127See id.

128See supra note 1 9.
129See id.
'
131

See id.

See sulpra note 116.
132See stpra note 112.
'" See sulpra note 119.
4 See 108 P.L. 357. section 424.
135See id.
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to improve the earnings stripping provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 36 The act
also require studies and reports on the effectiveness of transfer pricing and
contemporaneous documentation rules, identification of inappropriate uses of income tax
treaties due on June 30. 2005.137 A report of the effectiveness of the act's corporate
inversion provisions is due by December 31, 2006. 3' Earnings stripping is a big problem,
but it is only part of a much bigger pattern of shifting income to low-tax jurisdictions, the
other huge problem being transfer pricing.
The Act has been criticized and compared to past ineffectual bills for its failure
to address the earnings stripping problem that is considered by many to be the ultimate
benefit of corporate inversion. 3 9 The Act has also been criticized for grandfathering
corporations that inverted before March 4, 2003 from the changes.' 41 It has been said that
the new law leaves in place the elements of current law that make inversions desirable.14'
However, because of the risk that an inverted corporation may be considered foreign as
well as the increased cost of undertaking inversions, the Act will make most U.S.
corporations think twice before undertaking inversion transactions. The two specific
types of corporate inversion defined by the Act will effectively halt corporations from
reincorporating offshore for the time being, but it does not follow that the stemming of
corporate inversion indicates that the U.S. is now a favorable place for a multinational
corporation to be headquartered. The new anti-inversion legislation is more of a stop-gap
measure than a real long term solution. Further measures are necessary to ensure that
U.S.-based multinational corporations can remain competitive in a global marketplace.
VIII. Further Measures Necessary
From a pure tax standpoint, few attorneys would recommend the placement of
a multinational firm's headquarters in the U.S. because of the drawbacks of being
subjected to the worldwide system as well as being denied the advantages of being able
to partake in earnings stripping. 42 Further measures are needed to have the U.S. tax
system adequately reflect a globalized economy. The goal should be to make the U.S. a
preferred location for headquartering a corporation. Closing some of the loopholes that
allow for corporate inversion will be effective for the time being. but it may have the
unintended effect of encouraging corporations to seek alternative methods to reduce their
taxes.1 43 For example, new companies may decide to incorporate abroad from their
inception.

131See id.
See id. Section 482 requires all transactions between related parties be conducted on terms
consistent with an arm's length standard and permit Secretary of Treasury to reallocate income and
deductions among such parties if that standard is not met.
138See supra note 134.
131See suqpra note 116.
140See id.
141See id.

142See generallv Chris Edwards. New Data Show U.S. Has Fourth Highest Corporate Tax Rate, Cato
Institute Tax and Budget Bulletin. April 2002.
143See siupra note I. at 21. The Treasury Department has stated that measures designed simply to

halt inversion activity may address these transactions in the short run. but there is a serious risk that
measures targeted too narrowly would have the unintended effect of encouraging a shift to other
forms of transactions to the detriment of the U.S. economy in the long run.
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Corporate managers often argue that in order to maintain international
competitiveness, a reduction of the corporate interest rate would be in order.'" Some
economists postulate that the best way to halt the corporate inversion phenomenon and
make the U.S. a friendlier place for multinational corporations to be headquartered would
be to eliminate the high corporate tax rate that places these corporations at a significant
disadvantage in the international marketplace.1 45 But reducing the corporate tax rate
would result in a loss of corporate tax revenues in the short run and with the federal
deficit expected to rise over the next few years, the government will be reluctant to
disregard any revenue sources. The U.S. economy has already lost a lot of tax revenue
from corporations that have already inverted and a reduction
in the corporate tax rate
46
does not allow for Congress' goal of retaining the tax base.
Advocates for corporate tax rate reduction argue that such a cut would result in
many beneficial effects for the economy. The argument is that a reduction in corporate
taxes can benefit consumers, workers and stockholders by ultimately increasing
individual income tax receipts. 47 The reasoning is that because prices charged will
decrease as a result of a tax cut, wages will be increased, more workers will be hired,
more materials will be purchased for production and stockholders' dividends will
increase.148 Corporate tax cut advocates argue that over the long haul, the loss in
corporate tax revenues will be offset by gains in individual tax receipts. However, this
corporate tax reduction proposal has not ever been entertained by Congress or the
Treasury Department yet.149
Since U.S. corporations end up paying higher taxes on income earned in the
same global marketplace as their foreign counterparts. it is argued that the worldwide tax
regime that U.S. corporations are subject to should be changed into a territorial tax
regime that most foreign competitors operate under.'-( Similar to the corporate tax rate
cut proposal. it does not seem like an affordable solution at the present moment.
Advocates of change to a territorial system argue that the heavy burden that the
worldwide system places on U.S.-based multinational corporations will cause these
corporations to continually perform worse in both U.S. and overseas markets than their
foreign competitors and be subject to foreign takeovers.' 5 ' It is argued that all these
factors will eventually cause a drop in corporate tax revenues worse than the loss of
revenues that would initially be caused by shifting to a territorial tax regime. However, it
must be remembered that our competitors are all or even mostly territorial is overstated
by lobbyists. Some European countries have systems not so different than that of the U.S.
and all of them have carry forward credit rules to tax foreign subsidiaries currently on
their passive income and/or low-tax income from tax havens.
A more progressive approach has been suggested by several experts in order to
deal with the huge problem of transfer pricing, which is another part of the pattern of
shifting income to low-tax jurisdictions. Experts propose getting rid of the existing
1'4See supra

note 142.

"5 See Corporate Expatriation Protects American Jobs. Daniel J. Mitchell. available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Taxes/em829.cfm (last accessed Oct. 5. 2004).
146 Congress' Inversion Odyssey, Tax Notes Today. July
1. 2002. at 9.
147See generally The Economy of H.R. 5095. Fiscal Policy Memo. Scott A. Hodge (2002).
'4 See id. See also siqpra note 145.
4', See id.
511See szpra note 146.
15'See sulqra note 22. at 116.
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system of separate accounting and replacing it with the formulary system which the states
now use to allocate corporate income by payroll, asset, and sales. Under the formulary
system, a multinational corporation's actual economic presence in each country
(including employees, assets and turnover) would be used as a proxy to estimate how
much of total worldwide profits should be taxed there. This would eliminate the fiction
that net profits can be located accurately to the penny.
For federal taxation purposes, multinational corporations use a transaction
based approach called separate accounting.' 52 This approach requires all income to be
attributed to its source by tracing all transactions among affiliates.' 53 Internal transactions
must be priced in order to calculate taxable income according to separate accounts
maintained for affiliates in each country.' 54 There is a requirement that the prices
established for their internal transactions with foreign affiliates be set as if the foreign
affiliates were unrelated third parties.' 55 For state taxation, corporations that do business
in multiple states use a formulary system under which they do not separately price each
transaction but rather apportion their total income to each affiliate depending upon the
percentage of total business activity that is located in each state. 1 56 This process of using
a formula to assign a portion of the total income of a corporation and its affiliates that
operate in several different locations to each individual location is known as formulary
apportionment. 57 The affiliates that are
5 located in different states than the parent
corporation are treated as a single entity.1 8
Proponents of a shift to a formulary system claim that the current separate
accounting method is difficult to enforce and administer in an increasingly globalized
economy and that it perpetuates fiscal myths that corporate income can be precisely
allocated down to the last penny.' 59 The separate accounting system is administered by
means of a complex set of regulations. 6 A formulary system emulating the ones that the
states currently use would be effective for multinational corporations because of its
simplicity in comparison to the separate accounting method.6 1 Instead of multinational
corporations having to price every transaction that occurs between different nations. a
formulary system would allow corporations to apportion their income by using 62a
predetermined formula consisting of factors including property, payroll and revenue.
Because the formulary system taxes a corporation on its total combined income.,
corporations would not have much incentive to shift income from one location to another
for tax avoidance purposes. 163

152See
See
14 See
155See
116See
57 See
56 See

2004 WTD 175-15.
id.
id.
id.
1999 WTD 182-23
id.
id.

159See The Formulary Approach to the Taxation of Transnational Corporations: A Realistic
Alternative? Lindsay Celestin. available tit http://adt.librarv.usyd.edu.au/adt/publichtmI/adtNU/uploads/approved/adi-NU200209 17.133138/public/02whocl.pdf (last accessed November 14.
2004).
6 See id.
161See supra. note 156.
162See stqpra note 159.

163See supra note 156.
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Those who disagree with the formulary system approach think that adopting
such a method would introduce a host of new problems."" It is argued that formulary
apportionment is arbitrary and ignores market conditions. 165 Opponents of this approach
claim that global economic conditions and the structure of international business have not
yet reached the point where the formulary system would be feasible.166 The
counterargument to this by proponents of a formulary system is that different formulas
may be adopted in order to satisfy corporations operating in different types of
industries. 167
There is a delicate balance to be struck between retaining the tax base and
allowing for U.S.-based multinational corporations to remain competitive in the global
marketplace. While retaining the tax base is important, it is also imperative to enhance
the competitiveness of U.S.-based multinational corporations in order to prevent loss of
global market share and foreign takeovers,
both of which may result in decreased
6
corporate tax revenues over the long run. 8
IX. Conclusion
The anti-inversion provisions contained within the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004 will most likely be effective at discouraging most U.S.-based multinational
corporations from undertaking corporate inversion for the time being although there are
no provisions that prevent the problem of earnings stripping. The higher barrier that the
Act constructs will effectively discourage many corporations from considering the types
of aforementioned inversion transactions that have been very popular over the last 15
years. In addition. the reduction of foreign tax credit baskets and the allowance of foreign
tax credits to be carried forward for five more years serve to help U.S. corporations.
Although corporate inversion will be discouraged by this Act, the fact remains
that the U.S. is a relatively undesirable location for a U.S.-based multinational
corporation to be headquartered. Corporate inversion is symptomatic of more serious
problems that can be attributed to the U.S. tax system that causes U.S.-based
multinational corporations to be a competitive disadvantage when compared to its foreign
competition. Further measures will be necessary to strike an amicable balance between
retaining the U.S. tax base while allowing for U.S.-based multinational corporations to be
competitive in an increasingly global economy.

""See id.
165
See id
' ",
See

supra note 156. See also Tax Policy & Administration: California Taxes. or Multinational
Corporations & Related Federal Issues. http://www.unclefed.com/iGAORepols/ggd95171 _sum.html (last accessed November 3. 2004).
167
See supra, note 159.
'"' See supra. note 146.
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